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THE EFFECT OF UNIFORM COMMERCIAL




A. Pressure for Certainty and Harmony in the Laws Governing
International Commercial Transactions
The rapid growth of computer and telecommunications technolo-
gy over the past twenty years has facilitated the growth of global
financial markets and twenty-four-hour trading in securities, foreign
exchange, and financial instruments. Capital is highly mobile as its
managers search worldwide for the best investment opportunities.
International trade in goods and services has also expanded in volume
and speed. Rapid trading requires rapid settlement of one transaction
so that funds are available for the next transaction. The same
changes in technology permit faster payments in settlement of these
transactions. As a result, more money is moving around the globe
more rapidly than ever before.'
The internationalization and greater speed of commerce and
finance has caused financial institutions to establish operations in
several nations. The economic significance of national boundaries to
large corporations and financial institutions is being reduced. These
trends in transactions, payments, and transnational operation of
corporations have led to commercial pressure for greater certainty and
* Barrister and Solicitor, Senior Lecturer of Law, Monash University, Melbourne,
Australia; Visiting Professor of Law, Loyola of Los Angeles Law School.
1. One indicator of this is the number of payment messages passing through SWIFT
(Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication). The average daily
number of messages carried by SWIFT in 1982 was 317,000; in 1992 the number was 1.6
million. Of the 1992 messages, 25% were customer funds transfers or related to customer
checks, 28% were financial institution funds transfers, and 15% related to funds transfers
for forex transactions or loans and deposits. Samuel Newman, Society for Worldwide
Interbank Financial Telecommunication (SWIFT), in PAYMENT SYSTEMS OF THE WORLD
374, 381 (Robert C. Effros ed., 1994).
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uniformity in the law governing international transactions. Legal
disputes in international transactions may be subject to one or more
jurisdictions' laws. The determination of which jurisdiction's laws
govern which aspects of the transaction is a matter for the rules of
private international law of the forum where the suit is brought.
Different fora have different rules of private international law2 and
many of those choice-of-law rules are fact specific;3 hence, their
outcome is not able to be accurately predicted in advance. Some of
this uncertainty can be reduced-in legal systems which permit party
autonomy in choice of law-by parties including express choice-of-law
and choice-of-jurisdiction agreements in their contracts. However, it
is not always possible to achieve agreement on governing law and
jurisdiction and such agreements do not bind third parties who may
be involved in litigation.
Commercial interests are naturally averse to the uncertainty and
unpredictability inherent in the application of rules of private
international law. They seek certainty as to the legal rules under
which international transactions occur in order to accurately measure
and minimize legal risk, and they seek uniformity of rules across
jurisdictions to minimize compliance costs. Under commercial
pressure for greater certainty and uniformity in the legal rules
governing international transactions, the rules of private international
law are being supplemented or superseded in some areas by a range
of initiatives to harmonize the relevant legal rules across nations such
as international conventions4 model laws for enactment by nation
2. This may encourage forum shopping.
3. Under the private international law rules of common-law legal systems, the law
which governs many aspects of liability under a contract is the law of the jurisdiction with
which the contract has the closest and most real connection. See, e.g., Bonython v.
Australia, 1951 App. Cas. 201,219 (1950) (appeal taken from Austl.); 2 DICEY & MORRIS,
THE CONFLICr OF LAWS 1189 (Lawrence Collins ed., 12th ed. 1993). Connecting factors
to be considered include: the place of performance, any express choice of forum, place
of contracting, place of business of parties, and the currency of payment, although currency
would not be a dominant factor if the currency is one commonly used in the market such
as the U.S. dollar. 2 G.A. PENN ET AL., THE LAW & PRACrICE OF INTERNATIONAL
BANKING, BANKING LAW § 1.14 (2d ed. 1989). The common law in the United Kingdom
has been modified by the Contracts (Applicable Law) Act 1990 which adopts the Rome
Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations (1980).
4. See, eg., United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of
Goods, Apr. 11, 1980, 19 I.L.M. 668.
INTERNATIONAL CREDIT TRANSFERS
states, and model rules promulgated by international commercial
associations.5
B. Clarification and Harmonization of the Laws Governing High
Value Credit Transfers
The law governing commercial payments is subject to the same
pressure for certainty and uniformity. At a subnational level, the
pressure for certainty and uniformity in the law governing large value
wire transfers across the fifty states of the United States of America
led to the painstaking formulation of Uniform Commercial Code
(UCC) Article 4A from 1986 to 1989. Article 4A has since been
enacted in forty-nine states and the District of Columbia.6
That process was mirrored at an international level in the work
of United Nations Commission on International Trade Law
(UNCITRAL), which in 1992 finalized a Model Law on International
Credit Transfers for nations to consider enacting. No nation has yet
enacted it, but it has served as a model in the continuing work of the
Commission of the European Communities on promoting efficiency
and harmonization of laws concerning cross-border payments within
the European Communities (EC). The most recent product of the
Commission's work is a proposed Directive on Cross-Border Credit
Transfers,7 which has been influenced but not controlled by the
Model Law and Article 4A.
C. International Commercial Payments by Credit Transfer
Most commercial payments are made by an account transfer.
That is, the payor transfers an amount from its account at its bank to
the payee's account at the payee's bank. The transfer may need to
pass through one or more intermediary banks if the payor's bank and
the payee's bank do not have a direct correspondent relationship.
5. For example, the Uniform Customs and Practice for Documentary Credits,
International Chamber of Commerce Publication No. 500 (1993) is so widely used in letter
of credit contracts that it is in effect an internationally accepted set of standard rules.
6. South Carolina is the only state that has not officially enacted Article 4A. A bill
to enact Article 4A passed the South Carolina State Senate on April 27, 1995 (S.B. 251)
and has been introduced into the House. It will be assumed for the purposes of this Essay
that South Carolina will enact Article 4A so that it is the law in every jurisdiction in the
United States.
7. Published in Proposal for a European Parliament and Council Directive on Cross-
border Credit Transfers, 10 J. INT'L BANKING L. Supp., at i (1995) [hereinafter Proposed
Directive].
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The account transfer is accomplished by adjusting records of
indebtedness at each of the banks in the chain.
An account transfer may be a debit transfer or a credit transfer,
according to the party who initiates the transfer.8 Most high-value
domestic and international payments are made by credit transfer
through electronic message systems such as the Society for Worldwide
Interbank Financial Telecommunication (SWIFT), and through
national high-value credit-transfer systems such as Fedwire, CHIPS,
SIC, CHAPS, BOJ-NET, and BITS.'
Both Article 4A and the UNCITRAL Model Law apply only to
credit transfers. Both conceive of such credit transfers as a series of
payment orders, beginning with the payor, or originator, giving a
payment order to its bank and continuing with each bank in the
credit-transfer chain sending a conforming payment order to the next
bank in the chain until a payment order reaches the bank of the
payee, or beneficiary, which pays the beneficiary. The first sender is
the originator (0) who sends a payment order to the originator's bank
(OB). If OB accepts the order, it executes the order by sending a
new payment order in the same terms to the next bank in the chain,
perhaps an intermediary bank (IB), which accepts and then sends a
new payment order and so on until a payment order reaches the
beneficiary's bank (BB). The BB then accepts the payment order and
makes a credit to the account of the beneficiary (B). Each bank in
the chain is a receiving bank in respect of an incoming payment order
and each bank-except for BB-is also the sender of the next
payment order.
8. A debit transfer of funds is one initiated by the payee where funds are pulled from
the payor's account (for example, the payee presents the payor's check or draft for
collection at the creditor's bank-in the collection process the funds are pulled from
payor's account to payee's account at payee's initiative). A credit transfer of funds is one
initiated by the payor where the funds are pushed to the payee (for example, regarding
a wire transfer or a salary or benefit payment by direct deposit, the funds are pushed from
the payor's account at the payor's initiative).
9. Fedwire is the large-value U.S. funds and securities transfer system owned and
operated by the U.S. Federal Reserve System; Clearing House Interbank Payments System
(CHIPS) is the private sector large value U.S. funds transfer system operated by the New
York Clearing House Association; Swiss Interbank Clearing (SIC) is operated by the Swiss
National Bank and handles both large value and retail interbank payments in Swiss francs;
the Bank of Japan Financial Network System (BOJ-NET) for large value interbank
payments in yen is operated by the Bank of Japan; the Bank Interchange and Transfer
System (BITS) is operated by the principal Australian commercial banks for large value
interbank payments in Australian dollars.
INTERNATIONAL CREDIT TRANSFERS
Consider the following example of a credit transfer of five million
U.S. dollars from an originator in Berne, Switzerland to a beneficiary
in Melbourne, Australia, which would very likely be effected through
a CHIPS transfer in New York and settled across the accounts of the
New York Federal Reserve Bank:
0 - OB - IBI - CHIPS---> IB2 -> BB -- B
Berne Zurich New York New York Sydney Melbourne
This credit transfer has five segments.'0 The first four segments
consist of payment orders from a sender to a receiving bank; the last
is the action of BB in making the funds available to B.
The sending and accepting of a payment order creates a
contractual relationship between the sender and the receiving bank,
and may also give rise to other legal obligations such as duties in tort.
There is a preexisting contractual relationship between BB and B.
Thus a credit transfer consists of a series of bilateral contractual
relationships, which may span different national and subnational
jurisdictions, each of which has its own governing law of contract.
This law may differ from the law governing other segments. The law
governing liability in tort or restitution between immediate parties or
between remote parties in the credit-transfer chain may also be
different. Clearly, the potential for conflicts of laws is high in
international credit transfers.
D. The Impact of Article 4A on International Credit Transfers
The rules of Article 4A have a significant direct impact on the
law governing international commercial credit transfers and Article
4A has been and continues to be an important model in the process
of harmonizing the laws governing international commercial pay-
ments. Article 4A affects the law governing international commercial
credit transfers in three ways:
(1) Direct Effect: It is the law most likely to govern those parts of
international credit transfers which are carried out in the United
States. Because of the importance of the U.S. economy and the
10. The credit transfer chain may be more complicated than the example given. If OB
or BB is not a direct correspondent with a New York settling participant in CHIPS, then
another intermediary bank will need to be interposed. The conflicts of laws issues may
be more complicated if the originator or beneficiary is in a different jurisdiction from its
bank.
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widespread use of the U.S. dollar as a currency of payment, many
large-value international credit transfers originate or terminate in
the United States and many others pass through the United
States for clearing and settlement. Those segments of a credit
transfer, including clearing and settlement, which occur within the
United States are likely to be governed by Article 4A.
(2) Extended Direct Effect- By authorizing long-arm choice-of-law
rules, Article 4A may govern the whole of an international credit
transfer if part of it is carried out through a U.S. funds-transfer
system. By its choice-of-law provisions, Article 4A authorizes the
imposition of a consistent governing law-in practice, the law of
a U.S. jurisdiction which includes Article 4A itself-across an
entire credit-transfer-chain from the originator through multiple
intermediary banks and countries to the beneficiary if any part
of it is carried out through a U.S. funds-transfer system. This
produces consistency in governing law but the price is a poten-
tially unwelcome intrusion of U.S. law into relations between
non-U.S. parties.
(3) Modeling Effect on International Harmonization Initiatives:
By offering a model for national and international laws on
commercial payment, Article 4A contends with other models to
be the basis for a harmonized international law of commercial
payments. Article 4A has had and will have a considerable
influence on other national laws and supranational agreements or
model laws but in turn will itself be subject to influence and may
need to change to achieve greater harmonization of international
legislative models.
This Essay will examine each of these three effects of Article 4A
on the law of international commercial parments and evaluate the
health of Article 4A from an international perspective.
II. DIRECT EFFECr OF ARTICLE 4A AS THE LAW MOST LIKELY
TO GOVERN THOSE PARTS OF INTERNATIONAL CREDIT
TRANSFERS CARRIED OUT IN THE UNITED STATES
The major role of the United States in international trade and
world financial markets generates a huge volume of credit transfers
to and from parties in the United States each business day. These
international credit transfers have segments which are carried out in
the United States.
In addition, the U.S. dollar is a major currency for international
trade payments, foreign exchange transactions, and capital markets
INTERNATIONAL CREDIT TRANSFERS
placements occurring outside the United States-even where no
U.S.-based entity is involved. Payments by international credit
transfer in these transactions, which may have no U.S. connection
apart from the currency of payment, will very often be cleared and
settled in the United States, usually through a CHIPS payment in
New York which is settled across the accounts of the Federal Reserve
Bank of New York." Most CHIPS payments are international in
nature and originate from financial institution offices outside the
United States, including foreign branches of U.S. financial institu-
tions.12 According to the New York Clearing House Association,
CHIPS handles over ninety-five percent of all U.S. dollar payments
moving between countries around the world. On a typical business
day, CHIPS handles business payments worth more than one trillion
U.S. dollars, made up mainly of nearly two hundred thousand
international transactions, including foreign trade payments, foreign
exchange, securities settlement, and Eurodollar transactions. 3 Thus
a very high percentage of large-value credit transfers in U.S.
dollars-whatever the domicile of the commercial parties-will have
a segment in the United States such as a CHIPS transfer in New
York.
11. Most Eurodollar transactions are settled using CHIPS or Fedwire in New York.
Libyan Arab Foreign Bank v. Bankers Trust Co., 1 Lloyd's Rep. 259, 275-78 (Q.B. 1988)
(Eng.). Transactions outside the United States in dollars may be cleared outside the
United States-for example, in the London dollar clearing or Tokyo dollar clearing-but
the settlement between the clearing banks involved still requires a CHIPS transfer and
settlement on the books of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. hL This is because
account transfers must be settled at an institution which holds an account for the originator
or its representative bank-with a credit balance sufficient to cover the amount of the
transfer-and for the beneficiary or its representative bank. Large transfers require a large
credit balance in the currency of payment and that settling institution will usually be a
bank in the country of the currency of the payment, very often the central bank of the
country. The case cited involved a claim for payment of 131 million U.S. dollars by a
Libyan bank on the London branch of a U.S. bank. The court held that the payment
could be made by account transfer and, because of its size, that account transfer would
have to be settled in New York or it could be made by paying physical currency in
London.
12. A 1986 study of one day's transactions on CHIPS showed that foreign exchange
transactions and Eurodollar placements were responsible for 82.4% of the dollar value and
89.4% of the number of payments through CHIPS. See FEDERAL RESERVE BANK, A
STUDY OF LARGE-DOLLAR PAYMENT FLOWS THROUGH CHIPS AND FEDWIRE (1987);
Andrew T. Hook, The Clearing House Interbank Payment System (CHIPS), in PAYMENT
SYSTEMS OF THE WORLD 106,107 (Robert C. Effros ed., 1994) (analyzing Federal Reserve
monograph).
13. NEW YORK CLEARING HOUSE ASS'N, CLEARING HOUSE INTERBANK PAYMENTS
SYSTEM 2 (1994).
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To what extent does Article 4A govern part or all of these
international credit transfers that pass through a U.S. jurisdiction?
The determination of the law that governs the legal rights and
obligations of parties to a credit-transfer segment or of remote parties
in a credit-transfer chain is made according to the rules of private
international law of the jurisdiction where suit is brought. The choice
of governing law may therefore differ according to the forum of the
suit. If the law of a U.S. jurisdiction is chosen by the forum court as
the governing law for part or all of a funds transfer, then in the case
of commercial-credit transfers 4 Article 4A will be applied. The
likelihood of a U.S. jurisdiction's law-and hence Article 4A-being
chosen to govern a credit-transfer dispute will be examined from the
point of view of courts in three fora: a U.S. jurisdiction, a common-
law jurisdiction other than the United Kingdom, and a European
jurisdiction subject to the Convention on the Law Applicable to
Contractual Obligations, Rome 1980.
A. Suit Brought in the United States: Article 4A's
Choice of Law Rules
If suit is brought in the United States, section 4A-507(a)
prescribes three default choice-of-law rules which apply to a credit
transfer unless the affected parties otherwise agree or, in some
circumstances, a funds-transfer-system rule selects a different
governing law. The default rules are as follows:
(1) The rights and obligations between the sender of a
payment order and the receiving bank are governed by the
law of the jurisdiction in which the receiving bank is located.
(2) The rights and obligations between the beneficiary's
bank and the beneficiary are governed by the law of the
jurisdiction in which the beneficiary's bank is located..
(3) The issue of when payment is made pursuant to a funds
transfer by the originator to the beneficiary is governed by
the law of the jurisdiction in which the beneficiary's bank is
located."
14. Article 4A does not apply to debit transfers such as checks or drafts. These would
be regulated in the United States by Articles 3 and 4 of the UCC and applicable federal
regulation. Nor does Article 4A apply to consumer funds transfers which are regulated
by the Electronic Fund Transfer Act. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601, 1693(a)-(r) (1994).
15. U.C.C. § 4A-507(a)(1)-(3) (1990).
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Where suit is brought in the United States, the effect of default
rules (1) and (2) is that, subject to contrary party agreement or
funds-transfer-system rule, Article 4A will govern the rights and
obligations of the sender and the receiving bank in any payment-order
segment of the credit transfer where the receiving bank is located in
the United States. Further, Article 4A will govern the rights and
obligations between the beneficiary and its bank where the beneficia-
ry's bank is located in the United States. In the example of the
Switzerland-to-Australia credit transfer given above, Article 4A would
govern the second and third segments under the rules in section
4A-507(a).
B. Suit Brought Outside the United States in a Common-Law
Jurisdiction
There are no bright-line choice-of-law rules in the common-law
equivalent to section 4A-507(a). One relevant common-law choice-of-
law rule is that the account relationship between a bank and its
customer is governed by the law of the place where the account is
kept. 6 This rule when applied to the relationships between origina-
tor and its bank and between beneficiary and its bank would usually
produce the same choice of governing law in those relationships as do
the rules in section 4A-507(a)(1) and (2). That is, the law of the place
of the account, usually the place of business of the bank, governs.
But the application of this rule to the relationship between correspon-
dent banks in the credit transfer chain is unclear. Correspondent
banks maintain mirror image accounts for each other, called
nostro/vostro accounts, so prima facie there is not one account or one
place where that account is kept to which the rule can apply.
If correspondent banks do not expressly choose a law to govern
payment orders between them, it is not clear what system of law a
common-law court would choose for them. Presumably a court would
turn to the general rule that many aspects of liability under a contract
are governed by the law of the jurisdiction with which the contract
has the closest and most real connection. 7 Under such a rule it
seems obvious that in the Switzerland-to-Australia credit transfer, the
third segment-between the two New York banks-would be
16. Libyan Arab Foreign Bank v. Bankers Trust Co., 1 Lloyd's Rep. 259, 270 (Q.B.
1988) (Eng.).
17. See supra note 3.
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governed under this rule by the law of New York. In any event, the
two banks as members of CHIPS have expressly chosen New York
law so that that law would govern because the common law upholds
party autonomy in choice of law.
The more difficult choice-of-law issue is where a sending bank
and a receiving bank are in different jurisdictions. In that case the
common law's closest and most real connection rule may be unhelpful
in its generality. An analogy might be drawn with the relationship of
an issuing bank and beneficiary under a letter of credit, which is
presumed to be governed by the law with the closest connection to
the performance of the contract; that place is where payment will be
made, or initiated, against the presentation of documents, which is
usually the place of business of the issuing bank. 8 If this analogy is
sound, a payment order between two correspondent banks in a credit
transfer may be governed by the law of the place of business of the
receiving bank, which is where performance of the payment or-
der-sending the next payment order or, if the receiving bank is the
beneficiary bank, paying the beneficiary-occurs. On this basis the
second segment in the Switzerland-to-Australia credit transfer,
between the Zurich bank and the New York bank, would also be
governed by New York law including Article 4A.
Assuming the analogy is sound, common-law choice-of-law rules
would likely have the same effect as those in section 4A-507(a)(1) and
(2) but the common-law position on the law governing the relation-
ship between correspondent banks in different jurisdictions is not free
from doubt.
C. Suit Brought Outside the United States in a European Country
Subject to the Rome Convention
The Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obliga-
tions, Rome 1980, which is law in some member states of the
European Community (EC), including the United Kingdom, may be
more helpful. Article 4(1) provides that in the absence of a choice by
the parties, a contract is governed by the law of the country with
which it is most closely connected. For contracts entered into in the
course of a party's trade or profession, Article 4(2) establishes a
presumption that the contract is most closely connected with the
18. Westpac Banking Corp. v. Commonwealth Steel Co., [1983] 1 N.S.W.L.R. 735,741-
42 (Austl.); Power Curber Int'l Ltd. v. National Bank of Kuwait, [1981] 1 W.L.R. 1233,
1240 (Eng.).
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country where the party who is to effect the performance which is
characteristic of the contract has, at the time of conclusion of the
contract, its principal place of business or, where under the terms of
the contract the performance is to be effected through a place of
business other than the principal place of business, the country in
which that other place of business is situated.
This Essay is not the place to expound all the shades of meaning
in this presumptive rule and its qualifications.'9 The account
relationships between 0 and OB and between B and BB are likely to
be governed by the law of the place of business of the bank involved.
In the case of payment orders between correspondent banks, a rough
idea of the effect of Article 4(2) can be gained by making certain
simplifying assumptions. Let us assume that the characteristic
performance of a contract constituted by the sending and acceptance
of a payment order is for the receiving bank-other than the
beneficiary's bank-to send a conforming payment order to the next
bank in the chain and for the beneficiary's bank to credit the
beneficiary's account. Let us also assume that the receiving bank will
send that conforming payment order from the same place of business
at which it has received the incoming payment order. Then the law
of the place of business of the receiving bank will be the governing
law of the contract constituted by the accepted payment order. If we
also assume that the beneficiary's account is kept at the place of
business of the beneficiary's bank where the payment order is
received, then the law governing the payment-order contract as
between a sending bank and the beneficiary's bank will be the law of
the place of business of the beneficiary's bank. Under these
assumptions, the convention provides the same rules as section
4A-507(a)(1) and (2).
19. The Convention does not define what is meant by the performance which is
characteristic of the contract. The rules of the Convention do not apply to the issues listed
in Article 1(2) including the question whether an agent is able to bind a principal to a
third party. The presumptions in Article 4(2) do not apply to certain consumer contracts,
Article 5, and may, in the discretion of the forum court, be displaced by mandatory rules
of a country with which the situation has a close connection, Article 7. See 2 DICEY &
MORRIS, supra note 3, at 1230-48. See generally PETER KAYE, THE NEW PRIVATE
INTERNATIONAL LAW OF CONTRACT OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY (1993) (discussing
the implementation of the EEC's Contractual Obligations Convention in England and
Wales under the Contracts Act 1990).
April 1996] 1117
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D. Conclusion on Direct Effect of Article 4A in Suits Outside the
United States
If suit is brought outside the U.S. in jurisdictions under the
common law or the Rome Convention, it is likely that the rules of
private international law of those jurisdictions will determine that the
law of a U.S. jurisdiction including Article 4A governs: (1) the
relationship between originator and its bank where the originator's
bank is located in the United States; (2) the relationship between
beneficiary and its bank where the beneficiary's bank is located in the
United States; and (3) the relationship between a sending and a
receiving bank where both banks are in U.S. jurisdictions.'
It is less clear what law would be chosen to govern the relation-
ship between a sending and a receiving bank where the two banks are
in different jurisdictions. The choice-of-law rules of the common law
and the Rome Convention do not lead to the bright-line certainty of
the rules in section 4A-507(a), but in many cases, on the basis of the
assumptions made above, the law of the place of business of the
receiving bank would govern-as in section 4A-507(a)()-so Article
4A would be held to govern where the receiving bank's place of
business is in the United States2 Given the volume of transactions
involving U.S.-based commercial parties and the dominance of CHIPS
in processing international U.S. dollar payments, regardless of the
location of the commercial parties, Article 4A is therefore very likely
to govern at least some segments of most international credit transfers
in U.S. dollars and many other international credit transfers.
Article 4A has this major influence not so much by its own
virtues or content; rather, Article 4A piggybacks to prominence on
the commercial virility of the United States as a trading nation and
the importance of the U.S. dollar as a currency for international
20. See U.C.C. § 4A-507 (1990).
21. The UNCITRAL Model Law on International Credit Transfers also provides that
in the absence of party agreement, the law of the jurisdiction of the receiving bank governs
the rights and obligations arising out of a payment order. Eric E. Bergsten, UNCITRAL
Model Law on International Credit Transfers, 7 J. INT'L BANKING L. 276, 280 (1991)
[hereinafter Bergsten, Model Law].
The Hague Conference on Private International Law has outlined the problems of the
law applicable to international credit transfers and consulted with banks and funds-transfer
systems but has not yet produced a proposed solution. See Gregor C. Heinrich, Fund
Transfers, Payments and Payment Systems-International Initiatives Towards Legal
Harmonization, 28 INT'L LAW. 787, 823-24 (1994).
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payments.' This direct governing effect on the U.S.-connected
segments of so many international credit transfers is enough to
pronounce Article 4A alive and well in international commercial law,
albeit as only one among many systems of law that may regulate parts
of an international credit transfer.
The role of Article 4A described above does nothing to harmo-
nize or make uniform the law governing international credit transfers.
However, Article 4A does seek to achieve a unilateral harmonization
of laws by regulating more than just the U.S.-connected segments of
some international credit transfers.
III. EXTENDED DIRECT EFFECT OF ARTICLE 4A AS THE
UNIFORM GOVERNING LAW OF A CREDIT TRANSFER
Absent a uniform international law or convention to govern the
legal relations between parties to an international credit transfer, the
best that can be achieved is to bring as many issues in as many legal
relations as possible under the same governing law. As western legal
systems' conflicts rules allow for party autonomy in choice of law,
immediate parties can expressly choose the law to govern their
relationship. Conceivably, parties with a community of interests, such
as bankers, might choose a standard governing law. But the
temptations will be strong to choose the law of their own home
jurisdiction. Remote parties are unlikely to agree on a choice of law
in advance. UCC section 4A-507(a) prescribes default choice-of-law
rules for each bilateral relationship in a credit transfer. These rules
are subject to an express choice of law by the parties.
But section 4A-507 goes beyond regulating the aspects of a credit
transfer that touch the U.S. and seeks to extend its reach to cover
some international credit transfers from end to end. UCC section
22. The same is true of the law governing the high-value credit-transfer systems of
other commonly traded currencies. A large-value credit transfer in yen will likely be
cleared and settled using BOJ-NET in Tokyo and that part of the credit transfer will likely
be subject to Japanese law. BOJ-NET has a daily average of 14,961 transactions
representing 144.8 trillion yen-.1 trillion U.S. dollars. Similarly Swiss law would likely
govern that part of credit transfers in Swiss francs which passes through SIC. SIC handled
64 million payments in 1992 representing a total value of approximately 33 trillion Swiss
francs-most of the larger payments on this system are foreign exchange transactions
involving Swiss francs. INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, THE PAYMENT SYSTEM:
DESIGN, MANAGEMENT AND SUPERVISION APPENDICES 1, 3 (B. Summers ed., 1994)
(reporting transaction volumes).
April 1996] 1119
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4A-507(c) permits a funds-transfer-system rule" to select the law of
a particular jurisdiction to govern:
(i) rights and obligations between participating banks with
respect to payment orders transmitted or processed through
the system;24 or
(ii) rights and obligations of some or all parties to a funds
transfer any part of which is carried out by means of the
system.'
The law chosen by the funds-transfer-system rule need not bear a
reasonable relation to the matter in issue.26
The effect of section 4A-507(c) is to permit a funds-transfer-
system rule to create end-to-end uniformity of governing law for all
relationships in a funds transfer, part of which is carried out over the
system. Its effect is subject to: (1) parties other than participants in
the funds-transfer system having notice as specified; and (2) any
contrary express choice of law agreements between parties to a credit
transfer.2 7 The purpose of the provision is neatly expressed in the
official comment:
The ability of a funds transfer system to make a choice of
law by rule is a convenient way of dispensing with individual
agreements and to cover cases in which agreements are not
feasible. It is probable that funds transfer systems will adopt
a governing law to increase the certainty of commercial
23. A "funds-transfer system" is defined in UCC section 4A-105(a)(5) to mean
a wire transfer network, automated clearing house, or other communication
system of a clearing house or other association of banks through which a
payment order by a bank may be transmitted to the bank to which the order is
addressed.
U.C.C. § 4A-105(a)(5) (1990). Examples are CHIPS and SWIFT. Id. § 4A-105(a)(5) cmt.
3. Under section 4A-507(c)(i) a funds-transfer-system rule is a rule of an association of
banks governing transmission of payment orders through the association's funds-transfer
system and governing rights and obligations with respect to those orders. A funds-
transfer-system rule may override many of the provisions of Article 4A even if it indirectly
affects another party to the funds transfer who does not consent to the rule. Id. § 4A-
507(c) cmt. 4.
24. This choice of law is binding on participating banks. Id. § 4A-507(c).
25. This choice of law is binding on the originator, other sender, or a receiving bank
having notice that the funds-transfer system might be used in the funds transfer and of the
choice of law by the system at the time when that party issued or accepted a payment
order. The beneficiary is bound if, when the funds transfer is initiated, the beneficiary has
notice that the funds-transfer system might be used and of the choice of law by the system.
Id.
26. Id.
27. ld. § 4A-507(d).
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transactions that are effected over such systems. A system
rule might adopt the law of an Article 4A state to govern
transfers on the system in order to provide a consistent,
unitary law governing all transfers made on the system. To
the extent such system rules develop, individual choice-
of-law agreements become unnecessary.
28
The CHIPS funds-transfer system located in New York respond-
ed to this invitation by selecting the law of the State of New
York-including Article 4A as enacted in New York-to govern the
rights and obligations of all the parties to a funds transfer, part of
which is carried out across CHIPS.29
The publicly-owned Fedwire funds-transfer system which operates
under federal law-Regulation J, subpart B3 0-has explicitly incorpo-
rated Article 4A and applies it, with some minor variations, as federal
law, to funds transfers through Fedwire. Regulation J does not
incorporate any one state's version of Article 4A but incorporates the
uniform model of Article 4A approved by the National Conference
of Commissioners on Uniform State Law (NCCUSL) and the
American Law Institute (ALI). Regulation J-including the incorp-
orated Article 4A-governs:
(1) the Federal Reserve Banks that send and receive
payment orders; (2) senders that send payment orders
directly to a Federal Reserve Bank; (3) receiving banks that
receive payment orders directly from a Federal Reserve
Bank; (4) beneficiaries that receive payment by means of a
credit to an account at a Federal Reserve Bank; and (5) all
other parties to a funds transfer any part of which is carried
out through Fedwire, on the same terms as section
4A-507(c)-for example, subject to that party having notice
28. Id. § 4A-507 cmt. 4. If a credit transfer is made by use of more than one funds-
transfer system and there is inconsistency between the choice-of-law rules of the systems,
§ 4A-507(e) provides that the matter in issue is governed by the law of the selected
jurisdiction that has the most significant relationship to the matter in issue. Id. § 4A-
507(e). However, if one of those funds-transfer systems is Fedwire, then under U.S. law,
Regulation J, subpart B, will take precedence according to its terms over any other funds-
transfer system's choice of law. 12 C.F.R. § 210.25(a) (1995).
29. CHIPS Rule 3 provides in part: "The rights and obligations of [CHIPS]
participants and all other parties to a funds transfer of which a CHIPS payment message
is a part, arising from the funds transfer or from these Rules, shall be governed by the law
of the State of New York." BENJAMIN GEVA, THE LAW OF ELECTRONIC FUNDS
TRANSFERS § 3.03[1] n.15 (1995).
30. 12 C.F.R. §§ 210.25-.32.
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that Fedwire might be used in the funds transfer and that
Fedwire is governed by Regulation J and subject to any
contrary express choice of law agreements by that party.31
Thus the two principal large-value funds-transfer systems in the
United States apply Article 4A rules, subject to the notice require-
ment, to all parties to a credit transfer, any part of which is carried
out using those systems. In the example of the Switzerland-to-
Australia credit transfer, because the credit transfer passed through
CHIPS, under section 4A-507(c) the relationships between the Berne
originator and its Zurich bank and between the Melbourne beneficia-
ry and its Sydney bank would be governed by Article 4A if notice had
been given and there was not a contrary express choice of law.
Section 4A-507(c) thus allows funds-transfer-system rules to
maximize the coverage of one system of law over the entire length of
a credit transfer. While this produces a desirable uniformity in the
law governing a credit transfer, in practice it does so by giving an
extended extra-territorial operation to U.S. law which may be viewed
with some reservations by foreign parties to a credit transfer as a
somewhat imperialistic extension of U.S. law far beyond its borders.
. Such international concern has been demonstrated on two
occasions. When the United States suggested adding to the
UNCITRAL Model Law a provision equivalent to section 4A-507(c),
the UNCITRAL working group thought the proposal might be
reasonable if it was restricted to the relationships between banks in
the funds-transfer chain, but rejected the proposal because
it was excessive when it attempted to impose a law upon
nonbank originators and beneficiaries that was different
31. AL § 210.25(b)(2) (emphasis added). Regulation J, subpart B is not a
funds-transfer system rule. Id. § 210.25(a). However, it applies to "[o]ther parties to a
funds transfer any part of which is carried out through Fedwire to the same extent as if
this subpart were considered a funds-transfer-system rule under Article 4A." Id.
§ 210.25(b)(2)(v). It appears that this provision seeks to activate UCC § 4A-507(c) by
reference, so that any choice of law in subpart B is applied to other parties by virtue of
§ 4A-507(c) as if it were a choice of law in a funds-transfer-system rule. There is a
technical problem with this drafting method. Section 4A-507(c) permits a funds-transfer-
system rule to select the law of a particular jurisdiction to govern remote parties. But
subpart B does not select the law of a particular jurisdiction; it simply states that it governs
Fedwire funds transfers, and it incorporates the model version of Article 4A. Under a
strict construction then, § 4A-507(c) would not apply subpart B to remote parties to a
Fedwire funds transfer. However, the purpose of the provision is clearly otherwise and
a court using a purposive interpretation could overlook this technical objection. The
Federal Reserve could easily rewrite § 210.25(b)(2)(v) to directly apply subpart B to
remote parties who had notice, rather than relying on the reference to Article 4A.
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from that which would otherwise be applicable to their rights
and obligations and that they had not themselves chosen.
The proposal would give the funds-transfer system, which in
fact meant the banks, unfettered freedom to choose any law.
The concern was expressed that the funds-transfer system
might choose a law that was particularly favorable to the
banks and unfavorable to the nonbank originators and
beneficiaries.32
The second expression of international concern occurred when
the Federal Reserve Board sought to maximize the extraterritorial
application of Article 4A envisaged by section 4A-507(c). In June
1990, when revising Regulation J, subpart B, the Board proposed to
require any bank that sent or received payment orders through
Fedwire to warrant that it had given the notice required by section
4A-507(c) to all remote parties to the funds transfer.3 Several
commentators on the proposed regulation objected to this require-
ment. Some commentators, including a foreign central bank, objected
that it would be inconsistent with international payments practice for
Regulation J to purport to govern the relationship between foreign
banks and their customers outside the United States merely because
part of the funds transfer went through Fedwire. Another argued that
the warranty scheme would encourage retaliation against U.S. banks
through other countries enacting similar laws to export their own
payments law offshore, thereby creating greater legal uncertainty for
the domestic U.S. funds-transfer user community.34 The Board
deleted the warranty provisions from the final rule. In reply to the
objections described above, the Board noted that even if the remote
parties had received the notices contemplated by Article 4A, those
parties could expressly agree on an alternative law to govern the
rights and obligations between them.3
Apparently, notices have been given to foreign correspondents of
U.S. banks in respect to both Fedwire and CHIPS funds transfers.
36
As a result, Article 4A would be extended to govern the relationship
32. Report of the Working Group on International Payments on the Work of Its
Twenty-First Session, [1991] 22 UNCITRAL Y.B. art. 15, para. 29, at 147-48, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.9/341 [hereinafter Working Group Report on International Payments].
33. 55 Fed. Reg. 40,791, 40,795 (1990) (codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 210).
34. Id.; see Bergsten, Model Law, supra note 21, at 280. Professor Bergsten suggests
the central bank was the Bundesbank. Id-
35. 55 Fed. Reg. at 40,796.
36. Bergsten, Model Law, supra note 21, at 279-80.
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between a U.S. bank and its foreign correspondent in relation to
credit transfers that pass through CHIPS or Fedwire, subject to
contrary agreement. It is not known whether those foreign banks
passed on the notice to their customers and hence extended the reach
of Article 4A even further.
A. Long-Arm Operation of Section 4A-507(c) Can Only Be
Guaranteed if Suit Is Brought in a United States Court
In practice this long-arm application of Article 4A is only binding
on courts in a jurisdiction that enacts Article 4A. If a remote party
to a funds transfer which went through CHIPS or Fedwire brings a
suit in a U.S. court bound by Article 4A rules, then section 4A-507(c)
will apply and may subject that party's rights and liabilities to
determination under Article 4A. But if the party brings suit outside
the United States, the forum court will apply the choice-of-law rules
of the forum which will not include section 4A-507. Thus, some
forum shopping may be in order if a party does not want Article 4A
rules to govern or requires a forum whose conflict rules will not lead
to the application of Article 4A as part of the law governing the issue
being litigated.
It may be thought unlikely that a court outside the United States
would hold a nonbank foreign national subject to the law of a U.S.
jurisdiction in its relations with a non-U.S. bank unless there was an
agreement between the bank and the nonbank party to be so bound.
An interesting question 7 is whether a foreign nonbank originator or
beneficiary that has been given the requisite notice by its bank about
the possible use of CHIPS or Fedwire and those systems' choice-of-
law rules, is to be taken as having agreed to be bound by that choice
of law. If so, then in those legal systems that recognize party
autonomy in choice of law, that agreement would be upheld and the
law of the U.S. jurisdiction-including Article 4A-would be applied.
On the other hand, a notice in the bank's boilerplate terms that a
particular funds-transfer system and the choice-of-law provision might
be used, might reasonably be viewed merely as information about
what law may govern remote aspects of the funds transfer and as
having no relevance to the law governing the relationship between the
customer and its own bank. Presumably the answer would depend
upon the wording of the notice and a consideration of whether the
37. Id at 280 n.22.
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nonbank party would reasonably understand that the purpose of the
notice was to determine the system of law that governed its rights vis-
A-vis its bank.
Section 4A-507(c) goes as far as a national law can in seeking to
ensure that the same law governs an international funds transfer from
end to end. The funds-transfer systems to whom the section is pri-
marily addressed are U.S. systems, so rationally they will choose the
law of a U.S. jurisdiction and Article 4A as the extended governing
law. The practical effect of the section is thus to apply Article 4A
rules to parties whose funds transfer pass through Fedwire or CHIPS.
But the section will only have this effect on parties not in immediate
relation with the funds-transfer system if they have notice as required
and it cannot be guaranteed that Article 4A will be applied if suit is
brought in a non-U.S. jurisdiction. The harmonizing effect of section
4A-507(c) may be avoided by forum shopping outside the United
States. Nevertheless, the long-arm choice-of-law rules in section 4A-
507(c) are enough to conclude that Article 4A is not only alive and
well, but has a surprisingly long arm and healthy grip to govern all
disputes within the U.S. domestic and some foreign disputes over
international-dollar transfers that pass through Fedwire and CHIPS.
The extraterritorial extension of national law authorized by
section 4A-507(c) is the only type of harmonization of laws governing
international credit transfers that can be achieved by one nation
acting unilaterally. This type of unilateral harmonization has a
potential cost in alienating other nations because of its imperialist
overtones. Its efficacy may also be limited in litigation outside the
enacting nation.
IV. THE MODELING EFFECT OF ARTICLE 4A IN HARMONIZING
INTERNATIONAL LAWS ON COMMERCIAL PAYMENTS
More powerful harmonization of laws for international funds
transfers requires cooperation by other nations. In that process,
Article 4A provides a model which may influence individual nations
to adopt a compatible funds-transfer law or influence supranational
efforts to develop funds-transfer laws. Two such supranational efforts
are the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Credit Transfers
adopted in May 199238 and ongoing work by the Commission of the
38. UNCITRAL Model Law on International Credit Transfers, Nov. 25, 1992, 32
I.L.M. 587 (1993) [hereinafter Model Law]. Apart from the United States, no nation has
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European Communities on harmonizing European Community
member states' laws on cross-border credit transfers. The Commis-
sion has recently produced a proposed Directive on Cross-Border
Credit Transfers. 9
A. UNCITRAL Model Law
The Model Law applies only to international credit transfers, that
is, credit transfers where any sending bank and its receiving bank are
in different nations. It has not been drafted to apply to purely
domestic credit transfers. Article 4A covers both domestic and
international credit transfers.
The Model Law and Article 4A were developed over approxi-
mately the same period, although Article 4A took shape before the
Model Law, and was completed before the drafting of the Model
Law.' The preparation of the Model Law was significantly influ-
enced by the drafts of Article 4A because Article 4A was: (1) the
only statutory text to cover the banking law issues in credit transfers,
as all other countries rely on an uncodified body of general principles,
contracts, and judicial decisions; and (2) the only text to have
systematically considered the impact of the use of electronics on funds
transfers. 4' Moreover, the United States is a significant player in
international funds transfer and the harmonization of U.S. law and the
Model Law would be an important step towards broad international
harmonization of funds-transfer laws.
a comprehensive funds-transfer statute. The Model Law is not a convention but model
legislation, part or all of which legislators may adopt for their own jurisdiction. To date,
no nation has adopted legislation based on the Model Law. The European proposed
Directive, if adopted, will be the first legislation influenced by the Model Law. In
Australia adoption of the Model Law is not currently under active consideration; the
attitude of other nations is being monitored.
39. Proposed Directive, supra note 7, supp., at i.
40. Article 4A was prepared under the auspices of the NCCUSL and the ALI as part
of a wider package of UCC law reform involving revisions of Articles 3 and 4. A drafting
committee was formed by NCCUSL in 1986 and a final draft was adopted by NCCUSL
and ALI in August 1989. Since then, Article 4A has been enacted in the District of
Columbia and every state other than South Carolina. The UNCITRAL Working Group
on International Payments met for the first time to consider the preparation of model rules
in November 1987. A draft was adopted by the working group in December 1990 and
ultimately by UNCITRAL in May 1992. Bergsten, Model Law, supra note 21; Eric E.
Bergsten, A Payments Law for the World: UNCITRAL Model Law on International Credit
Transfers, in PAYMENT SYSTEMS OF THE WORLD 408, 413 (Robert C. Effros ed., 1994)
[hereinafter Bergsten, A Payments Law].
41. Bergsten, A Payments Law, supra note 40, at 416.
INTERNATIONAL CREDIT TRANSFERS
After the form of Article 4A was finalized, the U.S. delegation
to UNCITRAL expended great efforts in seeking to conform the
Model Law to Article 4A.4 These efforts met considerable but not
total success. After the Model Law was finalized by the working
party, the U.S. delegation expressed continuing concerns about points
at which the Model Law diverged from Article 4A and warned that
these concerns would prevent the United States from adopting the
Model Law. That criticism has continued.43
Points of divergence which concern the United States include the
following: (1) The Model Law imposes an obligation on receiving
banks to assist a prior sender whereas Article 4A does not; (2) the
Model Law imposes requirements on a receiving bank to give notice
of certain matters or errors to a sender, and in some cases deems a
receiving bank to have accepted a payment order by failure to give
notice of rejection-whereas Article 4A does neither; (3) the Model
Law does not preclude consequential damages for improper execution
of payment orders or failure to execute as comprehensively as does
Article 4A; (4) the Model Law does not allow a funds-transfer-system
rule to vary its provisions or make an effective long-arm choice of law
binding on third parties as Article 4A does; and (5) the Model Law
does not require finality of payment by a beneficiary's bank to a
beneficiary-for example, an unconditional credit of funds-as Article
4A does. It is not the purpose of this Essay to explore these
differences in detail. They have been traversed by other writers."
42. Carl Felsenfeld, The Compatibility of the UNCITRAL Model Law on International
Credit Transfers with Article 4A of the UCC, 60 FORDHAM L. REv. S53, S53 (1992)
[hereinafter Felsenfeld, Compatibility]. Professor Felsenfeld served with the U.S.
delegation to UNCITRAL.
43. The concerns are stated in 1991 U.N. Int'l Trade L. Y.B. 137-42, U.N. Doc.
AICN.9/WG.IV/WP.42. For an earlier account of the concerns of the United States see
Ernest T. Patrikis, UNCITRAL Payment Efforts, 15 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 45 (1989). For a
later and critical analysis of the Model Law, see ERNEST T. PATRIKIS ET AL., WIRE
TRANSFERS: A GUIDE TO U.S. AND INTERNATIONAL LAWS GOVERNING FUNDS
TRANSFERS (1993) (authors were senior legal counsel with Federal Reserve Bank of New
York and participated in drafting Article 4A and in the U.S. delegation to the
UNCITRAL Working Party). For a law and economics analysis see Raj Bhala, Paying for
the Deak An Analysis of Wire Transfer Law and International Financial Market Interest
Groups, 42 KAN. L. REV. 667 (1994).
44. Felsenfeld, Compatibility, supra note 42; see Carl Felsenfeld, Strange Bedfellows
for Electronics Funds: Proposed Article 4A of the Uniform Commercial Code and the
UNCITRAL Model Law, 42 ALA. L. REV. 723,723 (1991) [hereinafter Felsenfeld, Strange
Bedfellows]; Luc Thevenoz, Error and Fraud in Wholesale Funds Transfers: UCC Article
4A and the UNCITRAL Harmonization Process, 42 ALA. L. REv. 881 (1991); see also
sources cited supra note 43 (expressing concerns over differences between Model Law and
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This part of the Essay considers what future influence Article 4A and
the Model Law may have on each other and on other international
harmonization efforts.
The sponsors of Article 4A are fairly blunt on the prospects of
Article 4A being displaced by the Model Law in the United States.
The Permanent Editorial Board for the UCC in its commentary on
Article 4A and the Model Law has said:
The Model Law was drafted for world-wide enactment. It
is, however, unlikely in the extreme that it will be enacted
in the United States in the foreseeable future. It was
generally accepted by the foreign states in UNCITRAL that
there would be no movement to repeal Article 4A in the
United States and adopt the Model Law in its stead. The
two laws basically live together in harmony, but to the
extent there are differences they must be recognized and, to
the extent possible, avoided or adjusted by agreement.45
The differences between Article 4A and the Model Law stem from
different conceptions of their framers. Professor Felsenfeld, who
participated in the drafting of both laws, states that the drafters of
Article 4A took as their model an electronic, high-speed, high-volume,
low-cost credit-transfer system and funds-transfer system such as
CHIPS. For example, they were motivated by the need to maximize
speed of transactions and minimize cost and so preferred rules that
minimized any obligation on receiving banks to operate human checks
on payment orders for errors or authorization. The framers of the
Model Law, from many different countries, had in their minds a much
wider range of credit-transfer systems including ones based on paper,
telex, and magnetic tape and were not driven principally by high-
speed and low-cost considerations. Thus, there are more customer-
protection error-checking requirements in the Model Law than in
Article 4A.46
The United States seems intent on ignoring the Model Law for
the time being and it can afford to do so while no other nation adopts
a credit-transfer law based upon it. If other nations-especially
economically significant nations-do adopt their own credit-transfer
Article 4A which may hinder adoption of Model Law by United States).
45. PEB Commentary No. 13, [PEB Commentaries] U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan)
(Feb. 16, 1994).
46. Bergsten, A Payments Law, supra note 40, at 428-30; Felsenfeld, Strange Bed-
fellows, supra note 44, at 738-40.
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laws based on the Model Law there will be two or more "live"
statutory models competing to govern the international aspects of
credit transfers that involve both the United States-or the U.S.
dollar-and those other nations-or those nations' currencies. The
choice of governing law in any particular segment of such an
international credit transfer will depend upon the conflicts-of-law rules
of the forum where suit is brought.
Under that scenario it is possible that some conflicts of law
d6tente may be reached without further harmonization of the
substance of the different laws. For example, each jurisdiction could
accept that the governing law of each segment of the credit transfer
is the law of the place of the receiving bank. The existence of section
4A-507(c) could threaten such a d6tente by encouraging other nations
to also export their payments law. Much will depend on how far
apart the other national laws are from Article 4A. If there are
significant differences leading to significant conflicts, it is likely that
there will be commercial pressure to harmonize the competing models
and another round of harmonization bargaining will begin.
B. European Commission Initiatives on Cross-Border Transfers
The first potential international competitor to Article 4A is
currently taking shape in Europe. The Commission of the European
Communities has been working on payment-system issues in the single
market for some time.' In October 1994 the Commission issued a
proposed Directive on Cross-Border Transfers within the EC.'
The proposed Directive applies to credit institutions within the
member states of the EC and covers cross-border credit transfers
within the EC.49 The proposed Directive is not a comprehensive
regulation of legal issues relating to credit transfers like Article 4A or
the Model Law. Rather it deals with particular issues of efficiency,
such as timely execution and consumer/customer concerns about
47. Other work has concerned regulation of the relationship between cardholder and
card issuer. Work continues on the use of collateral and securities and a harmonized
European law on netting and set-off to minimize systemic risk in the payments system.
48. The adoption process for the proposed Directive involves lengthy consultation and
the possibility of amendment. It is expected to be implemented in member states in 1997.
Lotte Bojer, International Credit Transfers: The Proposed EC Directive Compared With
the UNCITRAL Model Law, 6 J. INT'L BANKING L. 223, 227-28 (1995).
49. The transfer must be from an account held at an institution or branch in one
member state to be made available to a beneficiary at an institution or its branch in
another member state. Proposed Directive, supra note 7, at ii (art. 2(f)).
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transparency of conditions and charges, which have been a source of
contention for some years.50 The proposed Directive: (1) requires
credit institutions to provide customers with clear written information
about their credit transfer services including the time needed for funds
to be credited to the beneficiary's account, the amount of charges
payable for the transfer and the basis for their calculation, the value
date, if any, applied by the institution, and redress procedures in case
of complaint; (2) prohibits unauthorized deductions by institutions
from the principal amount transferred;5' (3) promotes the timely
execution of payment orders by requiring a time scale to be agreed
and setting default standards of execution52 with interest payable to
both the originator and the beneficiary for late payment but no
damages for consequential loss; and (4) provides for a money-back
guarantee--if the credit transfer is not completed for any reason, all
institutions which accepted payment orders must refund the amount
of the credit transfer and the originator's institution must refund the
amount to the originator with interest and charges. There is no
express exclusion of consequential loss 3 The money-back guarantee
may be excluded by agreement where noncompletion is due to force
majeure or the payment amount exceeds E.C.U. 10,000.
The proposed Directive has clearly been influenced by the Model
Law, and through it Article 4A, in regard to timely execution and the
money-back guarantee. However, the money-back guarantee in the
proposed Directive was designed to encourage confidence in the use
of credit transfers whereas in Article 4A it was a trade off for the
almost total exclusion of recovery for consequential loss. The
proposed Directive does not exclude recovery for consequential loss
to the same extent as Article 4A.
The proposed Directive's provisions on disclosure of terms and
charges, based on European customer protection concerns, have no
parallels in the Model Law or Article 4A, although there are some
50. Bojer, supra note 48, at 223-24.
51. This is a response to the problem of "double charging" where multiple institutions
took charges out of the principal amount.
52. A receiving bank that accepts a payment order must execute it by the next
business day after receipt, the overall transfer must be completed within five business days,
and a beneficiary's bank that accepts a payment order must put the funds at the disposal
of the beneficiary by the end of the business day following acceptance by the beneficiary's
institution. Proposed Directive, supra note 7, at iii (art. 5(1)). Note that the beneficiary's
institution may accept a payment order subject to conditions. Id. at iii (art. 2(o)).
53. Id. at iv (art. 7); cf U.C.C. § 4A-104 (1990); Model Law, supra note 38, arts. 17,
18, at 596-97.
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parallel disclosure provisions in the Electronic Funds Transfer Act.'
The provisions preventing unauthorized deductions from the principal
amount of the transfer are similar to, although more elaborate than
section 4A-302(d). By contrast, the Model Law appears to permit
unauthorized deduction of charges.'5
The Commission's proposed Directive would apply to all
cross-border transfers within the EC in any currency and any amount.
The proposed Directive therefore does not apply to transfers to or
from accounts in the United States. A committee of the European
Parliament has since recommended limiting the Directive to transfers
in EC currencies and to amounts not exceeding E.C.U. 50,000. If the
limitation to EC currencies is accepted, a direct conflict of laws
between the proposed Directive and Article 4A is very unlikely
because the proposed Directive would not then cover European-origin
transfers in U.S. dollars which might pass through Fedwire or CHIPS.
But if the proposed Directive does apply to European-origin U.S.-
dollar transfers, there will be a potential conflict as to the governing
law between the proposed Directive and Article 4A, which would be
decided according to the conflicts rules of the jurisdiction in which
suit is brought. There is relatively little substantive conflict between
the terms of the proposed Directive and Article 4A-for example, the
standards for timely execution-but there may be significant conflict
between other aspects of an applicable European state's governing
law and Article 4A rules on the recovery of consequential loss. Such
conflicts might force further bargaining on harmonization.
If further harmonization discussions do occur, the differences
between the proposed Directive, the Model Law, and Article 4A
counsel against any optimism that Article 4A can be exported
internationally in pristine form. This is because certain assumptions
underlying Article 4A are not universal but are limited to the legal,
economic, and historical circumstances in the United States out of
which Article 4A was created.
The terms of Article 4A are based on: (1) practices and
assumptions of U.S. high-value electronic credit-transfer systems
which are mainly used for business and financial institution transfers
in sophisticated market transactions; (2) the pre-existing legal
framework of U.S. consumer law-mainly the Electronic Funds
54. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601, 1693(a)-(r) (1994).
55. See Model Law, supra note 38, arts. 15, 19(2), at 596-97.
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Transfer Act, which allowed the drafters of Article 4A to ignore
consumer credit transfers-and U.S. tort law-the threat of conse-
quential damages in Evra v. Swiss Bank Corporation6 drove the
banks to the law reform bargaining table; and (3) certain compro-
mises negotiated in the Article 4A drafting process such as the trade-
off of the money back guarantee for the exclusion of consequential
loss liability and the careful balancing of liability for losses caused by
interloper fraud in sections 4A-202 and 4A-203.
These elements may not apply in other countries or to other
types of credit-transfer systems or to market segments other than
commercial high-value transfers. Accordingly, legislation on credit
transfers in other jurisdictions may be driven by quite different
considerations to those that drove Article 4A, and the legislative
product may address different issues or be less comprehensive or find
different solutions. Article 4A is a high-quality piece of legislation for
the targets at which it was aimed but it would be highly unrealistic to
expect Article 4A to be a one-size-fits-all solution.
A more realistic view of the export potential of Article 4A was
the suggestion the Model Law could be split into two regimes: a
specialist one to deal with commercial high-value electronic credit
transfers where Article 4A rules would apply, and a more generalist
regime for other credit transfers and systems as Professor Felsenfeld
and the U.S. delegation to UNCITRAL suggested.57 Limited export
of Article 4A on that basis may assuage some concerns that led to
differences in the UNCITRAL Model Law but ii still involves the
assumption that compromises negotiated in the Article 4A drafting
process against the background of U.S. law are the best solution for
different countries with different legal liability frameworks. Attempts
to make universal the justifications for Article 4A rules by a law and
economics analysis based on common needs of international market
players are more persuasive." But before there can be widespread
agreement with the prescriptions of such an analysis, there must be a
widespread acceptance of the ranking of values that underlie the
56. 673 F.2d 951 (7th Cir. 1982).
57. Felsenfeld, Strange Bedfellows, supra note 44, at 771. The U.S. delegation to
UNCITRAL argued that the Model Law was based on slow speed credit transfers and did
not adequately deal with the needs of high-speed electronic transfers. One suggestion to
redress this problem was to add special rules for high-speed transfers. Working Group
Report on International Payments, supra note 32, art. 15, para. 26, at 147.
58. See, e.g., Bhala, supra note 43, at 667.
INTERNATIONAL CREDIT TRANSFERS
analysis.59 The evidence of the UNCITRAL negotiations is that
currently there is not.
Accordingly, it seems likely that different legislative regimes will
grow up to apply to credit transfers in different jurisdictions. The
Model Law is likely to have the effect of streaming these in particular
directions but not of controlling their ambit or terms if the proposed
Directive is any guide.
If that prediction is correct and Europe, Japan, or other major
common-law countries adopt a credit-transfer law-even using the
Model Law or something like it-and the differences between those
laws and Article 4A are significant enough to trouble market players,
it is likely that pressure will build for a new bargaining round of
harmonization of laws. If the U.S. comes to the international
harmonization table again, it may again assert the virtues of Article
4A, but if there are competing models on the field, it is likely the
United States will have to give some ground to achieve the agreement
of other nations to a harmonized international approach. If that is so,
we will see Article 4A and the UCC being influenced by the market
practices and concerns of other nations. Today it is difficult to
envisage such pressures bringing radical change to Article 4A but new
technologies and market practices may lead to significant change.
V. CONCLUSION
Today Article 4A stands alone in the world as an operational set
of statutory rules governing credit transfers. It reaches as far as one
nation's law can up and down the credit transfer chain through section
4A-507(c) and it is clearly a leading model for other national and
international laws. But its long-arm reach has created some rumblings
of resentment and U.S. diplomatic efforts to conform international
legislative models to Article 4A seem to have had their maximum
effect.
The United States competes in an international marketplace. It
is a significant economic and political player in that marketplace
which can influence but not control the marketplace. For the time
being Article 4A will exert a great deal of direct influence as the law
most likely to govern those parts of funds transfers that pass through
59. For example, that high-speed and low transaction costs of funds transfers are
superior goals to ensuring better fraud prevention and more accurate processing of
payment orders through additional error checks by receiving banks.
April 1996] 1133
1134 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 29:1107
the United States and, in the case of U.S.-dollar transfers that pass
through U.S.-funds-transfer systems, as the law that seeks to govern
the whole credit-transfer chain. But if the international marketplace
becomes significantly troubled by uncertainty as to the substantive
rules60 or by conflicts of laws in international credit transfers-
perhaps because of the rise of competitor laws to Article 4A in other
jurisdictions-there will be new demands for the international
harmonization of funds transfer laws. The United States will be able
to influence but not control the design of those laws. Like every
nation its domestic commercial laws-including the UCC-will be
affected by the developing laws of the international marketplace.
Unlike many nations, its domestic commercial laws may be a
significant model for the laws of the international marketplace but
they will be transformed to some degree in the process of their
internationalization.
Finally, the status of Article 4A-and the UCC-as state law puts
it in a more precarious position in an era of international harmoniza-
tion of commercial law. The process of harmonization requires
national representation at the bargaining table and, in the case of
treaties and conventions, a national commitment to implement. If a
national government has the constitutional power to enact that to
which it commits the nation, the international community is unlikely
to accept amendments and vetoes of international agreements or
significant delays in implementation by subnational jurisdictions within
that nation. If the United States commits to an international
agreement to harmonize commercial law, there will be international
pressure on the federal government and Congress to implement the
agreement as uniform federal law, thus preempting state law to the
extent of the agreement, rather than have it wind its way through the
NCCUSL and the ALI and fifty state legislatures. This has already
occurred with the United States ratification of the United Nations
Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods. This
phenomenon is well established in Australia where the federal
parliament regularly uses its power to implement international
60. Uncertainty could arise in issues not covered in Article 4A. For example, the
applicable laws for recovery of mistaken payments which Article 4A and the Model Law
leave to the governing law. In Swiss Bank Corp. v. State Bank of New South Wales
(Unreported, N.S.W.S. Ct. Cas. 50693) (1989) (Aust.), an Australian court considered a
restitution claim made by a Swiss originator against an Australian receiving bank in respect
of a fraudulently initiated funds transfer which passed through CHIPS. Neither Article
4A nor the Model Law would have provided any substantive rules to resolve the dispute.
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agreements to legislate in areas previously thought to be the domain
of the states. Federal preemption of credit transfer law did not occur
in the United States because the NCCUSL and the ALI were first in
the field with Article 4A and secured the Federal Reserve Board's
agreement to stay its regulatory hand and work with them on the new
law. The reason it is not now occurring is because there is no move
in the United States to adopt UNCITRAL's model law. But if, in a
future round of harmonization bargaining, the United States did agree
to some new harmonized international law of credit transfers, federal
implementation and hence preemption of Article 4A would be a
strong possibility.
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